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Pakistan’s political turmoil: Musharraf and beyond

The destructive political legacy of Pakistan's former general-president is visible in its kaleidoscope of crises, says Shaun Gregory.

It is a measure of his isolation that the resignation of Pakistan's president Pervez Musharraf appeared - when it came - to surprise only Musharraf himself. In his final speech to the nation on 18 August 2008 he seemed bewildered and depressed; a man facing political death, his mind unable fully to grasp the speed with which he had fallen from power. It was a man speaking to a mirror, trying to justify himself to himself one last time.

Shaun Gregory is professor in the department of peace studies at the University of Bradford, northern England, and head of the Pakistan Security Research Unit there. He is the author of Pakistan: Securing the Insecure State (Routledge, 2008)

Also by Shaun Gregory in openDemocracy:

"
Pakistan on edge" (25 September 2006)

"Pakistan: farewell to democracy" (29 October 2007)

"Musharraf: the fateful moment
" (16 November 2007)

It has not taken long for the resignation to expose the fact that the splinters in Pakistan's troubled polity go far deeper than the survival in office of an unpopular president. A week later, the ruling coalition fractured; the former prime minister Nawaz Sharif led his supporters out of the government on 25 August, amid the decision of his Pakistan People's Party rival Asif Ali Zardari to declare himself a candidate for the election of Musharraf's successor on 6 September 2008.

The damaging political fallout of Musharraf's departure is an early insight into the nature of his entire political legacy to Pakistan.

The president's balance-sheet

By the time of his farewell address, Pervez Musharraf had long lost the support of a host of constituencies he needed to remain in power: the Pakistani electorate, Pakistani civil society, the Pakistani media, the Pakistan army, the United States, and even his political cronies in the PML-Q whom the general-president had empowered as a political force through vote-rigging. The accumulated result was that he no longer commanded even the means to resist his own impeachment. When news of his resignation arrived, the Pakistani stock-market rose by 4.5% - though this was a muted and weary cheer against a backdrop of economic woes which have seen 25% wiped off the value of the Pakistani stock market in recent months.

His departure leaves a vacuum in Pakistan, but it is not of the character of that which followed the unexpected death in 1988 of Zia ul-Haq, his predecessor as military ruler of Pakistan. Too much power had already ebbed from Musharraf for that to be the case. However Pakistan is in a far more parlous state in 2008 than it was twenty years ago and much of the blame for that rests squarely on Musharraf's shoulders.

There is a stubborn and seemingly eradicable myth in Pakistan that the Pakistan army is all that stands between Pakistan and chaos. The peddlers of this myth, within and outside Pakistan, would do well to reflect that it was the army which ended Pakistan's hopes of a secular, democratic future in the early post-partition era; it was the army which led Pakistan to the break-up of the nation in 1971; it was the army which took Pakistan to the brink of nuclear confrontation in 1999 and 2001-02; and it is the army once again - after nine years of Musharraf's rule - which has taken Pakistan to the edge of chaos.

True, civilian political leadership in Pakistan has been and remains neo-feudal and corrupt. But how much of the failure of Pakistan's democracy to develop and mature since 1947 can be laid at the feet of the Pakistan army and its intelligence arm the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)? These institutions have after all systematically undermined democracy and civil society in Pakistan for decades, and shored up a small autocratic elite against the aspirations of the emergent middle class in Pakistan and against the hopes of what educated and wealthy Pakistanis condescendingly refer to as the "common man".

So powerful has this myth of the Pakistan army become that it utterly resists contrary evidence. Musharraf was lauded by the White House as a democrat even though he was responsibile for a host of violations: he rigged elections, exiled pluralist political leaders, repressed federal politics, made political deals with Islamic extremists, pressured the judiciary, undermined civil society, and disbarred, arrested and in some cases "disappeared" political opponents. Meanwhile, he was trumpeted as incorrupt even though under his leadership the army siphoned off billions of dollars of aid for its own interests, greatly expanded the commercial and financial activities of its private conglomerates, and inserted more than 1,000 military officers into senior civilian roles in everything from the petroleum ministry to university vice-chancellorships.

Among openDemocracy's many articles on Pakistan under Pervez Musharraf:

Ehsan Masood,
"Pakistan: the army as the state" (12 April 2007)

Ayesha Siddiqa, "Pakistan's permanent crisis" (15 May 2007)

Anatol Lieven, "At the Red Mosque in Islamabad" (4 June 2007)

Maruf Khwaja, "The war for Pakistan" (24 July 2007)

Irfan Husain, ""Pervez Musharraf's desperate gamble" (5 November 2007)

Ayesha Siddiqa, "Pakistan after Benazir Bhutto" (28 December 2007)

Fred Halliday, "The assassin's age: Pakistan in the world" (28 December 2007)

Maruf Khwaja, "Pakistan: dynasty vs democracy" (9 January 2008)

Irfan Husain, ""Pakistan's judgment day" (22 February 2008)

Irfan Husain. "Pervez Musharraf: the commando who couldn't" (19 August 2008)

Musharraf was similarly heralded as a champion of the free media - a point to which he referred in his resignation speech - despite the fact that Pakistan slipped down the international press-freedom rankings during his tenure (from 119 [out of 139] in 2002 to 157/168 in 2006).

Most important of all, Musharraf was praised as a staunch ally in the "war on terror" even though under his rule Pakistan has continued to contravene the supposed principles and objectives of this war: by supporting terrorism as an instrument of state policy; by continuing to support the Taliban even as it strikes from safe havens in Pakistan against Nato and United States/United Kingdom forces in Afghanistan; by failing to extract al-Qaida from Pakistan's tribal areas; and by failing to prevent Pakistan from emerging as arguably the wellspring of international Islamist terrorism.

The ingredients of peril

The remaining apologists for Pervez Musharraf usually offer two defences to these kinds of charges. The first is that it is rogue elements of the ISI and not the Pakistan army which is responsible for Pakistan's linkages with terrorism (such as the attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul on 7 July 2008 in which the ISI is strongly suspected of complicity). The second is that the Pakistan army has been pushed into certain actions by US policy.

In relation to the first, Musharraf himself asserted in 2006 that the ISI was a disciplined force and did what the army told it to do. There is no reason to doubt this.

In relation to the second, it is unquestionably true that the war in Afghanistan and the George W Bush administration's crude reliance on military power has, for Pakistan's state, greatly complicated the situation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North West Frontier Province (NWFP). However, no external power drove the Pakistan military to repress secular politics and civil society, to disregard the legitimate claims of the federal states, to court religious extremists and terrorists, or to assume control of a large slice of the Pakistan economy.

The explanation for all these actions lies in the determination of the Pakistan military, and the privileged elite it supports, to place its own interests before those of the people of Pakistan. As the man in control of Pakistan from October 1999 to August 2008, Musharraf cannot evade responsibility for these actions, nor consequently for the part these decisions have played in pushing Pakistan into crisis.

The assassination of Benazir Bhutto - a huge body-blow to Pakistan, notwithstanding the many flaws of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader - was part of the long, slow crisis that marked the last year of Musharraf's rule. The hapless new coalition government formed after the elections of 18 February 2008 - divided politically and still largely focused on the wrong issues, has now to face the challenges of a state in the utmost peril.

The ingredients of this peril are manifold. The Pakistani economy is on the slide and many of the elite are beginning to take their assets out of Pakistan or to prepare for flight; the Taliban and their tribal allies have taken control of parts of the tribal belt and are increasingly assertive across Pakistan through targeted suicide-bombings; Balochistan is in violent turmoil; there are growing federal tensions between the Sindh and Punjab; sectarian violence is on the rise (not least in Karachi and in the Kurram agency); and the United States in the final days of the Bush administration has stepped up direct military actions inside Pakistan (which both presidential candidates are likely to continue, with little regard to the wishes of the Pakistan government). Against this backdrop, and almost unnoticed, the centre of gravity of Pakistan's polity is shifting in an increasingly conservative Islamic direction, driven by anti-western antipathy.

A country on the edge

Moreover, it was evident during the short life of the Asif Ali Zardari / Nawaz Sharif government that this administration was being shown little of the patience and indulgence shown to Musharraf by either Washington or London. This was a mistake since the government - as its collapse on 25 August 2008 confirmed - was always weak. It did not command the army or the ISI, and needed to be given time and space to find meaningful responses to the plethora of problems Pakistan faces - not all of which would have pleased the west.

While Pakistan burns, attention is now inevitably focused on the issue of Musharraf's successor. The PPP leader, Benazir Bhutto's widower Asif Ali Zardari - who announced his intention to run on 23 August - is likely to take the post. The presidency is however a fragile position without the support of the army; and Zardari is loathed by the Pakistan army. The stage is thus being set for another unstable political dispensation - with Zardari (probably) in the presidency, Sharif controlling the Punjab, and the army waiting in the wings. The prospect is that this trilateral relationship is unlikely to survive for long. The most stable outcome - also perhaps the most likely - would be a partnership between Nawaz Sharif and senior and Islamically conservative Punjabi military officers, a move which would be consistent with Pakistan's drift towards Islamic conservatism and away from the west.

If Washington continues its policy of allowing its short-term objectives in the FATA/NWFP to obscure the far greater danger of Pakistan's collapse, then this will probably accelerate Asif Ali Zardari's political demise and play into Nawaz Sharif's hands. The risk too is that more intense US military operations in Pakistan will push Pakistan ever closer to the abyss. If Pakistan should edge further towards state failure, some may even find themselves wishing for the return of Pervez Musharraf.

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Pakistan Security Research Unit

Shaun Gregory, Pakistan: Securing the Insecure State (Routledge, 2008)

Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy (Pluto Press, 2007)

 
This article is published by Shaun Gregory, , and openDemocracy.net under a Creative Commons licence. You may republish it free of charge with attribution for non-commercial purposes following these guidelines. If you teach at a university we ask that your department make a donation. Commercial media must contact us for permission and fees. Some articles on this site are published under different terms.

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John Maszka (not verified) said:



Mon, 2008-09-01 01:08

An Escalation of the War in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a Very Bad Policy.

Conservatives and liberals can argue the merits of the surge in Iraq , or the need to deal with terrorism now rather than later. I want to focus on something else: the impact of the perspective of 1.5 billion Muslims around the world. I’m not implying that it is somehow homogeneous, just relevant; more relevant than my opinion at least.

Taking the war on terror back to Afghanistan (and most likely Pakistan) is bad for a number of reasons: the perspective of the international Muslim community; the fact that a military solution has not worked thus far, so why keep kicking a dead horse (especially when it has the potential to trample you); the delicate balance of power in the immediate theatre and in the broader region; the likely negative reaction of other states; and last but not least, its potential impact on the price and availability of oil.

Pakistan ’s reaction to the Bush Doctrine has been somewhat mixed. Musharraf was caught in the middle between pleasing the U.S. to ensure continued military and economic support, and the preferences of his constituents who resent the U.S. presence there. The region is already very unstable because of this tension between the US applying pressure from the outside and the internal desire of the populace to rid themselves of the unwanted American presence.

We can say the exact same thing about Afghanistan , Karzai is in a very similar position as Musharraf was. In 2006, Karzai had to start rearming the warlords to maintain order. Similarly, in September 2006, Pakistan was forced to recognize the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan - a loose group of Waziristani chieftains, closely associated with the Taliban, who now serve as the de facto security force in charge of North and South Waziristan .

If Senator Obama becomes president, and refocuses the war on terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan , the best we can hope for is another five to six years of what we’ve seen in Iraq . But this best-case scenario is very unlikely.

In addition to a multiple-front war, we would be dealing, not with a fallen state as with Iraq , but with two established states. This could possibly work in our favor as long as they continue to remain on our side. But as already mentioned, the tension is high, and there is a very delicate balance keeping Karzai in power. What if Karzai falls to a coup or assassination? And now with Musharraf stepping down, what happens if Musharraf’s successor plays to the popular demands of the people? We could find ourselves fighting the armies of the sovereign states of Afghanistan and Pakistan , in addition to insurgent forces there. If we consider the history of this region, we realize that this is not as far-fetched as it might sound on the face of it.

As we all know, the Taliban was comprised of Sunni Islamists and Pashtun nationalists (mostly from southern Afghanistan and western Pakistan ). The Taliban initially enjoyed support from the U.S. , Pakistan , Saudi Arabia , and the United Arab Emirates in the early 1980s to fight the Soviets. By 1996, the Taliban had gained control of most of Afghanistan , but its relationship with the U.S. and most of the rest of the world became strained. Most of the international community supported the Taliban’s rival, the Afghan Northern Alliance .

Still, even after the U.S. began to distance itself from the Taliban in late 1997, Pakistan , Saudi Arabia , and the United Arab Emirates continued to officially recognize the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Even after 9/11 when Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates officially stopped recognizing the Taliban, Pakistan continued to support it. The Taliban in turn, had tremendous influence in Pakistani politics, especially among lobby groups- as it virtually controlled areas such as the Pashtun Belt ( Southeast Afghanistan , and Northwest Pakistan ) and Pakistan-administered Kashmir .

Going back to the perception of the international Muslim community … When the U.S. demanded that the Taliban turn Bin Laden over, it initially offered to turn Bin Laden over to Pakistan to be tried by an international tribunal operating according to Sharia law. But Pakistan was urged by the U.S. to refuse. Again, prior to the beginning of U.S. air strikes against Afghanistan , the Taliban offered to try Bin Laden according to Islamic law, but the U.S. refused. After the U.S. began air strikes, the Taliban offered to hand Bin Laden over to a neutral state to be tried under Islamic law, but the U.S. again refused. This is important because in the eyes of the greater international community, the war in Afghanistan was justified (at least initially). But in the eyes of the international Muslim community, especially given the Taliban’s offer to turn over Bin Laden, it was an unnecessary war. This, combined with the preemptive war in Iraq , has led many Muslims to equate the war on terror with a war on Islam. Senator Obama’s plan to escalate the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan will only serve to reinforce that impression.

Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, an Islamic political party in Pakistan , won elections in two out of four provinces in 2003, and became the third largest political party in the Pakistani parliament – with substantial support from urban areas (not just border regions). This speaks to the tremendous influence Islamic groups enjoy in Pakistan .

This strong influence is fueled by the fact that the Pashtun tribal group is over 40 million strong. The Taliban continues to receive many of its members from this group today. In fact, the Pakistani army suffered humiliating defeat at the hand of these so-called “insurgents.” Finally, in September 2006, Pakistan was forced to officially recognize the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan. Many saw the Pakistani government’s acknowledgment of the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan as not only a military necessity, but also a political one as well – a concession in response to the growing internal pressure on the Musharraf administration from the people of Pakistan who resent the U.S. presence and involvement in the region.

Just consider the many, many public protests against the Pakistani government’s compliance with the United States . For instance, on January 13, 2006 , the United States launched a missile strike on the village of Damadola , Pakistan . Rather than kill the targeted Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s deputy leader, the strike instead slaughtered 17 locals. This only served to further weaken the Musharraf government and further destabilize the entire area.

On October 30, 2006 , the Pakistani military, under pressure from the U.S. , attacked a madrasah in the Northwest Frontier province in Pakistan . Immediately following the attack, local residents, convinced the U.S. military was behind the attack, burned American flags and effigies of President Bush, and shouted “Death to America !” Outraged over an attack on school children, the local residents viewed the attack as an assault against Islam. On November 7, 2006 , a suicide bomber retaliated. Further outrage ensued when President Bush extended his condolences to the families of the victims of the suicide attack, and President Musharraf did the same, without ever offering their condolences to the families of the slaughtered children.

Last year troubles escalated surrounding the Pakistani government’s siege of the Red Mosque where more than 100 people were killed. Even before Musharraf’s soldiers took the Lal Masjid the retaliations began. Suicide attacks originating from both Afghan Taliban and Pakistani tribal militants targeted military convoys and a police recruiting center.

There are countless more examples; too many to mention in detail. Likewise in Afghanistan ; April 30, 2007 for example, when hundreds of Afghans protested US soldiers killing Afghan civilians. Why can’t the powers that be recognize that we’ve been in Afghanistan for nearly seven years, and in Iraq for over five; a military approach is not working. If we must focus the war on terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan , let’s focus on winning the hearts and minds of the beautiful people of these countries, rather than filling their hearts with bitterness and hatred toward us. With their support, we can offer them the financial and technical assistance that they need to rebuild their infrastructure, their agriculture and their economy. With their support, we can offer them the needed resources to rebuild their human capital and start attracting foreign direct investment. But without their support, we cannot possibly have any positive influence in this region at all; our only influence will be that of brute force, bribery of corrupt officials, and outright coercion. It will be a long, hard, costly and bloody endeavor, and the people of these countries will continue to suffer.

Let’s not forget that Pakistan has nuclear weapons. Let’s not also forget that this is a highly Muslim-concentrated area, the Islamic concept of duty to come to the aid of fellow Muslims would no doubt ensure a huge influx of jihadists in this type of a scenario. Why on earth would we want to intentionally provoke a situation that would not only radicalize existing moderates in the region, but could also potentially cause the influx of a concentration of radical jihadists from elsewhere into an already unstable region (that has nuclear weapons no less)? We would be begging for a nuclear proliferation problem.

We like to assume that we would have the upper hand in such a scenario. But we have been in Afghanistan since October of 2001. And we have yet to assume the upper hand. The fight in Afghanistan has the potential to become much more difficult than it already is. Nor would it be unheard of to expect other major powers to back these radical jihadists with economic and military assistance in much the same way that the US backed the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union . Beyond the fact that roughly 1/5 of the world’s population is Muslim (approximately 1.5 billion people- 85% Sunni, 15% Shia, Ibadiyyas, Ahmadis and Druze), we have to remember that Muslims are the majority in 57 states (out of 195). Most of these have Sunni majorities, which gives them added political power.

China has traditionally backed Pakistan . What would China do if the US were to find itself at war with Pakistan ?

India has tremendous economic and security interests in the region. Let’s not forget that while India has been in nearly continual conflict with Pakistan , primarily over the Kashmir issue, it has the second largest Muslim population in the world next to Indonesia . What happens if India were to side with the U.S. in a potential conflict with Pakistan ? It will have a very difficult task justifying that position with its very large Muslim population. A U.S.-Indian alliance could also spark more terrorist attacks in the Kashmir region; it could also create added tension to the already tenuous relationship between India and Iran , which has a long history of support for Pakistan . Or, if radicals gained control of Pakistan ’s nuclear arsenal, a nuclear attack against India could spark a nuclear altercation between the two nuclear powers. Or, what if radicals then gained control of India ’s nuclear arsenal?

On the other hand, what happens if India for some reason (either via a coup or due to Muslims gaining the upper hand in the long-running Hindu-Muslim conflict) were to side with Pakistan against the United States ? It seems unlikely now, but not completely unrealistic considering the on-again, off-again relationship between the U.S. and every country in that region. We constantly flip-flop in our foreign policy. An attack on Pakistani soil would be a perfect example of this type of wishy-washy foreign policy, as the Bush administration guaranteed Musharraf that the U.S. would never do such a thing (as much as Karzai wants us to). Speaking of Karzai, what if he is ousted and we find ourselves at war with Afghanistan . What would India do then, given its friendship with Afghanistan ?

Also consider the U.S. position on Kashmir , which has a predominantly Muslim population. Pakistan wants a plebiscite, as called for in a 1949 UN resolution, to essentially allow the people to decide which state the region should belong to. India refuses a plebiscite, claiming Kashmir and Jammu as an integral part of India . The U.S. is arming both sides through billions in aid to Pakistan and selective proliferation to India , but insists Pakistan stem terrorist activities flowing from inside its borders, and at the same time discourages India from attacking Pakistan . Yet an escalation of war in the area could backfire badly.

Beyond all that we still have to consider a slew of other states such as Saudi Arabia , Iran , and Russia – not to mention the central Asian states - all of which have economic and/or political and security interests in the region. How will they react to an escalation of the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan ?

Finally, what would such a scenario do to oil prices and availability? I’m 100% in favor of America developing alternative energy sources, but again that’s my opinion, and the oil conglomerates have not been listening to me. Unfortunately, the facts are that the oil lobby is a very powerful entity. Even more to the point, our country could not ween itself off of oil overnight, even if it wanted to. We have to consider what such an escalation would do to oil prices, and the overall availability of oil.

The oil embargo of 1974 (in support of Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippur war against Israel ), in retaliation against the U.S. for its support of Israel had devastating economic and political consequences on the U.S. and much of Europe . Also, the more recent boycott of Danish products across the Muslim world, in retaliation for the 2005 cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, demonstrates the ability of the international Muslim community to act collectively.

Escalating the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan would also demonstrate the fickle and hypocritical nature of America ’s foreign policy. We supported the Taliban when it served our interests (to oppose the Soviets in Afghanistan ) in spite of clear human rights abuses. But now we condemn the Taliban (and much of the Muslim world) over the very same human rights abuses (against women … etc.), while we also continue to ignore similar or same human rights abuses in China, Saudi Arabia, Israel … etc., when it’s convenient for us to do so. We did the same thing with Saddam Hussein; arming him in spite of clear and egregious human rights abuses when he was our ally, and condemning the same actions when he wasn’t.

The U.S. practices selective proliferation with India , and selective sovereignty with those it chooses (today Pakistan , tomorrow someone other than Pakistan ), while at the same time violating the sovereignty of other states- depending on its whim at the time.

The United States government insisted that the Taliban turn over Bin Laden, but the United States itself has refused on several occasions to return foreign nationals (being held on death row in America) to their state of domicile because the U.S. wanted them to face execution, and the home state did not uphold the death penalty. We also continue to refuse to acknowledge the ICC because we don’t want American military personnel tried in an international court. How is that so different from the Taliban wanting Bin Laden tried in an Islamic court?

Rather than blindly accepting that America holds some God-given moral superiority over the rest of the planet, we need to realize that everywhere, humanity has a God-given right to live, love and prosper. Our children have the right to grow up in an environment free of air strikes and constant assault from an external enemy. They have the right to attend schools without fear of being maimed and killed inside of them. And they have the right to be children, instead of orphans. No state has the right to take that away from your children, or from mine. Imagine now that Senator Obama is planning to escalate the war on terror where you live.

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